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month EONIA Swap was a valid indicator of a financial crisis in the Eurozone during 2005-2014. The 
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50 stock index and the Euro STOXX 50 volatility index. 
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Eurozone during 2005-2014, but its validity is challenged by the omitted variable bias of various 
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financial crisis and during an economic recession. Correlation exists with the stock market returns, 
stock market volatility and the development of the spread, but any conclusions cannot be made on the 
causality or the predictive force of the spread to a financial crisis. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
During 2007-2010 the financial markets in the Eurozone faced turmoil and 
turbulence due to a financial crisis. The origins of the crisis came from the liquidity 
crisis originated from subprime mortgages in the United States in 2007. The crisis 
lead eventually to the collapse of high-grade investment bank Lehman Brothers, 
which contributed heavily to the financial crisis in Europe and introduced a 
sovereign debt crisis. The financial crisis affected the government bond market 
heavily and caused problems for example for the economies of Greece and Ireland 
(Moisescu & Giurescu, 2016). 
The spreads between LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) and OIS (Overnight 
Indexed Swap) have been shown to be a barometer of financial distress in previous 
research. For example, before the crisis in the credit markets began in 2007, the 
LIBOR-OIS spread was around 10 basis points, but on the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers the spread increased rapidly to nearly 365 basis points (Sengupta & Man 
Tam, 2008). 
The European equivalents for LIBOR and OIS are the Euribor and the EONIA Swap. 
The Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) is a rate of the averaged interest rates at 
which banks in the Eurozone offer to lend funds to other banks in the euro money 
market and the EONIA Swap is a derivative reference for the Euro Overnight Index 
Average (EONIA). (European Money Market Institute, 2018.)  
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the spread between the 3-month Euribor and the 
3-month EONIA Swap rates in the Eurozone during the years 2005 and 2014. With 
the help of an autoregressive model with an exogenous predictor, the aim is to see if 
there exists any dependency with the returns of a specific stock index. The Euro 
STOXX 50 index is the stock index of interest. The purpose is to evaluate how valid 
indicator the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread was of a financial distress and financial 
crisis in the Eurozone during the time. The main research question is: 
“Was the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread a valid indicator of a financial crisis in the 
Eurozone?” 
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Secondly, the correlation with the Euro STOXX 50 volatility index is assessed, 
which is designed to measure market expectations of near-term up to long-term 
volatility. This is calculated by measuring the square root of the implied variance 
across all options of a given time to expiration. (STOXX, 2018.) 
Finally, the correlation with specific macroeconomic shocks and the spread is 
evaluated. The effects of the sovereign debt crisis and the subprime crisis for 
example are among the macroeconomic shocks that are examined in this thesis.  
The research expects some dependency with the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread with 
the stock indices, the volatility index and macroeconomic shocks. If the Euribor-
EONIA Swap spread is a valid barometer on financial distress and could be used to 
forecast financial crises, there should be a correlation with significant decreases of 
the stock indices, market volatility and certain macroeconomic events that affect the 
financial markets. 
The public official data is retrieved from internet-resources and existing research on 
LIBOR-OIS spreads is used as a reference. To calculate the correlation, an OLS-
based regression analysis is conducted to the given time-period with statistical 
software for the data. After that, some specific macroeconomic events are 
determined, and the spreads are examined manually on the specific dates in time. 
LIBOR-OIS spread is generally regarded as how expensive or cheap it is for banks to 
borrow in relative to a risk-free rate, which can be considered as a government bond, 
for instance. The spread represents a difference between a rate that has some credit 
risk and a risk-free rate and thus is an indicator of credit risk. Increase in the 
interbank market spread implies that banks might not be able to pay their short-term 
debt. 
Euribor-EONIA Swap spread should thus depict the same situation in the Eurozone. 
Similar observations are expected for the data of spreads between the 3-month 
Euribor and EONIA Swap rates from the same period of time as for those as the 
LIBOR-OIS spreads.  
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2 THE EUROPEAN INTERBANK MARKET 
Whenever examining the financial markets, the first distinction should be made 
between the money markets and the capital markets. The difference between the two 
markets comes from the maturity of the securities traded in each market. In the 
money market short-term debt-instruments with terms of maturity is less than one 
year are traded, whereas longer-term debt-instruments with terms of maturity of one 
year or greater are traded in the capital markets. (Mishkin, 2016, p. 73.) 
Instruments in the money market tend to be more liquid than the instruments in the 
capital market, since they are more widely traded. They also tend to have smaller 
fluctuations in prices and are thus considered as safer investments compared to the 
instruments traded in the capital markets. Money market instruments are commonly 
used by banks and corporations to earn returns on their short-term funds. (Mishkin, 
2016, p. 73.) 
The different kinds of money markets can be further distinguished in terms of 
instruments traded in the market. Money market instruments can be traded in the so-
called discount market, where treasury bills and commercial bills are traded, and the 
market for commercial papers which are quoted on a discount basis. Alternatively, 
the certificate of deposit market, money market deposits, repurchase agreements and 
the interbank market are type of money markets quoted on a yield basis. (Howells & 
Bain, 2008, p. 304.) 
In this research the focus is on the interbank market. The interbank market is a 
market for non-negotiable deposits which can be disposed only by withdrawals and 
the maturities of these deposits can range from overnight to one year. The market is 
commonly used by banks to adjust their liquidity positions, for instance. (Howells & 
Bain, 2008, p. 308.) 
The interest paid to the deposits in the interbank market represents a marginal cost of 
funding for the banks, and this rate is commonly known as the Interbank Offered 
Rate. These rates are closely related to the official rate of interest set by the central 
bank, since both the interbank market and the central bank are similar sources of 
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liquidity for the banks. Some examples of these rates are the London Interbank Offer 
Rate and the European Interbank Offered Rate, and they are calculated daily for 
different maturities. (Howells & Bain, 2008, p. 308.) 
The money market in Europe is considered as somewhat extraordinary due to the 
existence of a monetary union and a single currency. In the Eurozone, the Euribor 
Interbank Offered Rate is used to measure the rates of deposits for various maturities 
and the Euro Overnight Index Average for overnight deposits. The official interest 
rate is set by the European Central Bank, and it is common for the entire money 
market in the Eurozone. (European Central Bank, 2018.) 
The integration of the financial markets is important to the Eurozone as to any other 
monetary union, since it offers some protection against asymmetrical shocks due to 
risk-sharing of banks. For example, if the banking sector is fully integrated, banks 
operating in country A and country B should be identical. Country A holds a large 
portfolio of loans of country B and vice versa. A shock in country B makes part of its 
loans non-performing and this introduces decreasing revenue for the bank in country 
A. However, the bank in country A can compensate its losses due to the shock by 
boosting the revenues attained from the rising values of loans in country A. (Grauwe, 
2013 p. 233–234.) 
Banks tend to form long-term relationships with other banks and engage in peer 
monitoring to decrease the credit-risk uncertainty in their activities. Different kinds 
of shocks in the financial markets can create a lack of trust in the interbank market 
and it can hinder the lending activities. (Blasques et al, 2018.) 
Research suggests that from 1999 to 2010 the European money markets were fully 
integrated. The European Central Bank applied the same interest rate of lending for 
all the banks and the banks applied the same rate for lending for other banks. 
However, after the 2010 sovereign debt crisis the interbank market in the Eurozone 
has been relatively less integrated, since the banks do not trust each other anymore as 
much. (Grauwe, 2013 p. 229.) 
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The sovereign debt crisis in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain during 2010 raised 
worries in the interbank market of the Eurozone. The banks owned large proportions 
of government debt from these countries and experienced large losses. The crisis 
raised the interest rates of the government bonds and in the same time the interest 
rates that the banks were using to fund themselves. This made the borrowing costs to 
rise more than the rates in lending, which lead to increased losses of the banks. This 
created distrust among the banks in the Eurozone. The banks in the countries where 
the sovereign debt crisis hit the most lost their access to the interbank market. 
(Lakdawala et al, 2018.) 
Similarly, the subprime crisis in 2008 had also its effect on the European interbank 
market at the time. Blasques et al. (2018) found out that shocks in credit-risk 
uncertainty lead to extended periods of low market activity and reduced peer 
monitoring in the European interbank market during 2008-2011 in the Netherlands. 
Affinito and Franco Pozzlo (2017) made similar observations in Italy: The liquidity 
crisis in 2007 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers were associated with a 
remarkable reduction of the relative integration in the Italian banking sector. The 
situation was the same with the research from Iyer et al. (2014) in Portugal. 
On the other hand, the entire interbank market didn’t suffer from the losses. For 
instance, the Euro Interbank Repo market has been observed to be more resilient in 
the case of a shock and repo loans acted as shock absorbers in the interbank market. 
A repo is essentially a collateralized loan that is sold in the same time as the forward 
agreement is been made to repurchase securities at a certain maturity date between 
banks in the interbank market. (Mancini et al, 2016.) 
The issues in the European interbank market are current, since investors have been 
worried about Italy’s sovereign debt after the general election in 2018 (Financial 
Times, 8
th
 of October 2018). If the Eurozone faces another sovereign debt crisis, it 
might have significant effects on the interbank market. 
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2.1 INTEREST RATE 
The rate of interest is generally defined as cost of money over time (Gibson, 2003, p. 
248). Basically, the interest rate is the price a borrower pays for the use of money as 
a loan. For the lender the interest rate is the amount of compensation received for the 
risk exposure taken in the agreement. 
From the definition it can be identified that the risk structure is one of the main 
determinants to the level of the interest rate. The rate of interest is influenced by the 
degree of risk taken by the lender. Higher rates of interest are charged from the 
relatively riskier borrowers than from the more reliable borrowers that are evaluated 
to have a good degree of solvency and smaller probability to default. Also, the lender 
might demand a liquidity premium that is charged on the decrease of the liquidity of 
the lender. The risk structure of the interest rate thus depends on the default risk and 
on the liquidity risk on the agreement. (Mishkin, 2016, p. 113–119.)  
Similarly, loan agreements for longer periods of time have higher rates of interest 
than short-term loan agreements due to the increased uncertainty over time. This can 
be seen in the bond-market as well, where a “term premium” is the excess yield that 
investors require for bonds with identical risks of default and liquidity, but with a 
longer time to maturity due to its uncertainty compared to short-term bonds 
(Mishkin, 2016, p. 119–121). 
Another way to interpret the interest rates comes from the money demand. The 
demand for money in general influences the interest rates through the law of demand 
and supply (Pilbeam, 2010, p. 82). The relationship between the money demand, 
money supply and the rate of interest is illustrated in the figure below: 
12 
 
Figure 1. The supply and demand for money (adapted from Pilbeam, 2010, p. 83). 
The rate of interest 𝑟1 is defined in the equilibrium where the money demand 𝑀𝑑1 
equals the money supply 𝑀𝑠1. Changes either in the money demand or in the money 
supply would change the equilibrium rate of interest. 
If the demand for money increases because of fast economic growth, the country’s 
central bank can decrease the demand by raising the interest rates and increasing the 
cost of money (Gibson, 2003, p. 248). For example, the European Central Bank can 
change the money supply or the money demand through monetary policy and interest 
rate changes to meet specific interest rate targets (Schabert, 2009). 
These interest rate targets are implemented mostly to adjust price stability and to 
keep the rate of inflation under control. The inflation usually acts as a floor for the 
cost of money and only in rare cases the rate of interest can fall below the economy’s 
rate of inflation (Gibson, 2003, p. 248). A fall below the rate of inflation would 
imply a decrease in the purchasing power parity for the lenders, which explains the 
inflation premium on the rate of interest. 
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Many kinds of interest rates exist on the financial markets due to their different risk 
structures. One of the most important interest rates used in the Eurozone as 
benchmark interest rates are the Euribor and EONIA which are closely linked to each 
other, since the longer-term interest rates like the Euribor are determined by the 
market expectation of short-term rates (Tamakoshi & Hamori, 2014). In the next 
chapter these rates and their role on the interbank market and the EONIA Swap are 
discussed. 
2.2 EURIBOR 
The Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) is the rate at which interbank deposits in 
the Eurozone are being offered by a one prime bank to another for a specific period 
of time. Euribor is a common benchmark used by money markets throughout the 
Eurozone and anywhere that euros are traded. (Gibson, 2003, p. 129.) 
Euribor is quoted daily for spot value (T+2) by the European Money Market 
Institute. The rate is calculated by averaging the inputs of the panel data of European 
prime banks, excluding the highest and the lowest 15% of the data. Maturities of the 
rates range from one week to one year. (European Money Market Institute, 2018.) 
The introduction of the single currency to the Eurozone in 1999 made the European 
banks to think that it would be necessary to establish a new interbank rate to the 
monetary union. The first quotation of the Euribor was quoted on the 30
th
 of 
December 1998 for value 4
th
 of January 1999, a maturity of one week. After that the 
number of maturities were increased, and they included the maturities of one week 
and 1-12 months. From November 1
st
 2013 onwards, the number of maturities were 
decreased and currently only maturities of one week, two weeks, one month, two 
months, three months, six months, nine months and one year are quoted. (European 
Money Market Institute, 2018.) 
Euribor has taken a significant role in monetary policy decisions over the years, since 
it is commonly used as a reference rate for household loans, corporate loans and 
other loans with variable rates of interest in the Eurozone. Even the financial 
institutions themselves tend to use the Interbank Offered rate as a reference rate of 
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interest instead of the central bank interest rates or the Treasury bill rates. (Pilbeam, 
2010, p. 114.) 
The figure below illustrates the development of the 3-month Euribor rate during 
2005-2014. The graph indicates the increases in the value during the subprime crisis 
in 2008 and during the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. This tells us that financial crises 
impose turbulence on the interbank market. 
 
Figure 2. The development of the 3-month Euribor 2005-2014 
2.3 EONIA & EONIA SWAP 
2.3.1 EONIA 
The Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) measures all overnight unsecured 
lending transactions in the interbank market. EONIA is commonly used as a 
benchmark for pricing transactions in the capital markets in the Eurozone and 
anywhere that euro-based derivatives are traded. It was introduced at the same time 
as the Euribor. (Gibson, 2003, p. 127.) 
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Overnight means a day from the TARGET-system (Trans-European Automated 
Real-Time Gross-Settlement Express Transfer system) for which the benchmark is 
calculated to the next TARGET day. EONIA is computed as a weighted average of 
the contributing panel banks in the European Union (EU) and European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries. It was first quoted in 4
th
 of January 1999 based on 4
th
 
of January 1999 overnight deposit. (European Money Market Institute, 2018.) 
2.3.2 Interest rate swap 
Interest rate swap is a derivative instrument, which is an agreement between two 
parties to exchange interest rate payments. In a typical interest rate swap one 
participant pays the other participant fixed rate payments at specific periods of time, 
while the counterpart agrees to pay a floating rate of interest to the other participant. 
One example of a floating rate is the Euro Interbank Offered Rate. A simple 
agreement in which fixed rate payments are swapped for a floating rate payment with 
another party is often referred as “plain vanilla interest rate swap”. (Pilbeam 2010, p. 
398.) 
 
Figure 3. A plain vanilla interest rate swap 
The figure above illustrates how a plain vanilla interest swap works. The bank A 
originally borrows with a floating rate of interest (Euribor, for instance) and bank B 
borrows with a fixed rate of interest. Let us consider next that both banks are 
borrowing 100 million euros from the financial markets and bank A wants to borrow 
with a fixed rate of interest and bank B wants to borrow with a floating rate of 
interest. If the banks want to engage themselves in an interest rate swap, bank A is 
obligated to pay bank B the fixed rate of interest to finance its debt and bank B is 
obligated to pay the floating rate of interest to bank A to finance its debt. There 
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would be no need for exchanging the principal, since both banks are borrowing the 
same amount of 100 million euros. 
The receiving and the payment of the interest rate happen simultaneously without 
any change in the principal amount, and only the net cash flows are paid after 
maturity. In the typical case where the swap is arranged by a bank, the price of the 
swap depends on the bank´s estimate on the amount of default risk, the easiness of 
finding a counterpart and on the term structure of interest rates in the bond market. 
(Howells & Bain p. 449–451.) 
2.3.3 EONIA Swap 
The EONIA Swap is a form of plain vanilla interest rate swap involving the EONIA-
rate being exchanged for a fixed interest rate. The EONIA Swap was initially 
introduced to increase the range of money market benchmark rates from a derivative 
perspective. Implemented maturities were 1, 2 and 3 weeks as well as 1 to 12 months 
since June 2005 and 15, 18, 21, 24 months since May 2007. (European Central Bank, 
2008.)  
Overnight Index Swaps like the EONIA Swap work as any other plain vanilla 
interest rate swap where a fixed rate of interest cash flow is exchanged for a variable 
rate of interest cash flow and vice-versa. The relation between EONIA and EONIA 
Swap can be illustrated with the formula (1) below, which shows us how the EONIA 
Swap is determined. 
 
𝑟 =  
360
𝑛
[∏(1 +
𝑟𝑖 × 𝑑𝑖
360
𝑡𝑒−1
𝑖=𝑡𝑠
) − 1] 
 
        
                   (1)  
Here 𝑟 describes the floating rate in the interest rate swap, which takes the 
compounding interest into account and n is the maturity of the swap in days. 𝑡𝑠 is the 
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start date of the EONIA Swap and 𝑡𝑒 is the end date. 𝑟𝑖 is the EONIA fixing rate on 
the day i and 𝑑𝑖 is the maturity in days that the EONIA fixing rate 𝑟𝑖 is applied. 
(European Money Market Institute, 2018.) 
The EONIA Swap was introduced in 3th of June in 2005. On July 2014 the European 
Money Market Institute announced the discontinuation of the EONIA Swap Index 
due to the lack of contributing panel banks (European Money Market Institute, 
2018). 
What information do the EONIA Swap rates contain? Hernandis and Torró (2013) 
investigated the information content of the EONIA Swap rates before and during a 
financial crisis. From the definition of the swap introduced in equation (1) it is 
known that the EONIA Swap should reflect the future path of the EONIA rate. This 
indeed was the case in the period before the financial crisis in 2007, but during the 
crisis the linkage was not observed to be as clear. In the research it was also 
conducted that the EONIA Swap rates can be used as exact indicators of the interest 
expectations of the money market agents. 
Statistics of the European Money Market Institute indicated tight bid-ask spreads and 
strong daily volume of trade during 2000-2007. During the same time, the volume of 
EONIA Swaps doubled. The significant increase in volume and liquidity of the 
swaps in the euro money market reflect the importance that the EONIA Swap had 
during its time. Trenca et al. (2012) observed that EONIA Swaps were the most used 
instruments in speculation and interest rate hedging, and thus were the most liquid 
market in the Eurozone interbank markets. It was also concluded that the liquidity 
problems in the international financial markets caused an increase in the volatility of 
the European swap rates. 
Statistics below illustrate the development of the 3-month EONIA Swap from 2009 
to 2014. The graph clearly indicates the values of EONIA Swap rates rose 
significantly during the financial crisis in 2008 and during sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe. This indicates again that the subprime-crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
created disturbance to the interbank market. The path of the 3-month EONIA swap is 
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also observed to follow closely the path of the 3-month Euribor introduced 
previously. 
 
Figure 4. The development of the 3-month EONIA Swap 2005-2014. 
2.4 THE EURIBOR-EONIA SWAP SPREAD 
A lot of research has been conducted on the spread between an Interbank Offered 
Rate and an Overnight Indexed Swap, especially between OIS and the London 
Interbank Offered Rate, often referred as LIBOR. The equivalent benchmark rates in 
the Eurozone interbank market are the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and the EONIA 
Swap. In addition to existing research on the two types of interest rates, the main 
reason to exclude other interest rates for example from the bond market, is the focus 
exclusively on the interbank market. 
In this research the spread between the two rates is evaluated, since their spread 
should indicate the credit risk in the interbank market in the most efficient way. In 
addition to the risk premium, the Interbank Offered Rate should reflect the expected 
path of the monetary policy. The Overnight Indexed Swap should reflect the 
expectations of the development of the rates used in overnight lending and the 
expectations of the monetary policy rates in a given currency. Thus, the spread of the 
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two rates offers a measure of the stress and the health in the interbank market, 
excluding the effects of policy rate expectations from the model. (Cui et al, 2016.) 
The spread should always have a positive value due to the nature of the two 
benchmark rates. The spread represents a difference between an Interbank Offered 
Rate that includes some credit risk and a risk-free rate such as the EONIA Swap, 
which makes the spread an indicator of credit risk in the interbank market. For 
example, the Euro Interbank Offered Rate measures the interest rate on which the 
banks offer to lend unsecured funds to other banks in the Eurozone. Since this 
includes the exchange of a principal, there always exists risks in liquidity and default. 
However, in the EONIA Swap the interest rates are swapped without any change in 
the principal amount. The principal isn’t exchanged and thus the EONIA Swap is 
relatively more risk-free for the banks. The difference between the Euribor and the 
EONIA Swap should thus always be positive in the basic setup. 
The spread is important since it involves two commonly used benchmark rates which 
have a huge impact on the economy and the capital markets. The Interbank Offered 
rates are commonly used as benchmark interest rates on various financial products. 
Disruptions in the interbank market would thus have a significant effect on the 
banking system, the transmission of monetary policy and the financial markets. (Cui 
et al, 2016.)  
The graph below illustrates the development of the spread between the 3-month 
Euribor and the 3-month EONIA Swap during 2005-2014 in basis points. The peaks 
in the spread have occurred during the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2012 where the spread broke through the value of 100 basis 
points. The first significant increase in the spread occurred during the announcement 
of BNP Paribas in 2007 to cease three of its funds, that were exposed to subprime 
mortgages. After that, the spread increased during the further stages in the financial 
crisis. 
20 
 
Figure 5. The development of the Euribor-EONIA Swap-spread during 2005-2014. 
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3 THE EUROPEAN STOCK MARKETS 
Capital markets include instruments with the maturity of one year or more. The 
capital markets can be further divided into debt markets which consist of government 
bonds and other debt instruments, and to equity markets where equities like stocks 
and other similar assets are traded. (Pilbeam 2010, p. 6–7.)  
In this research the focus is entirely in the stock markets and the equity side of the 
capital markets. Stock markets, equities and stock indices are commonly seen in the 
media and they are followed by hundreds of millions of private and institutional 
investors daily and they are nowadays an important part of the international financial 
markets. 
Statistically the biggest stock markets are located currently in the United States, but 
European stock markets have also a major contribution to the global financial 
markets. The major stock markets in Europe are the London Stock Exchange, NYSE 
Euronext (Europe), Deutsche Borse and BME Spanish Exchange with a combined 
share of 18% of the global stock market. (Pilbeam, 2020, p. 206.) 
The stock markets are commonly illustrated in the form of stock indices, which are 
measurements of different sections of the stock markets. Stock market indices are 
calculated as weighted averages of the stocks that are selected to the index with 
various criteria of selection. Stock indices are a common tool used by investors and 
financial institutions to interpret the market and compare the returns of various 
investments. Some of the most significant stock indices around the world are the 
S&P 500-index, Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq Composite, Nikkei 225-
index and the FTSE 100-index. (Lo, 2016.) 
The equity markets in the Eurozone are very closely integrated, and one explanation 
is offered by the existence of the common currency. Investors from different 
countries in the Eurozone can invest into foreign markets without currency risk. 
Currency risk has been observed to be one explanation for “home bias” in the equity 
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markets, which discourages investors from a foreign country to invest into equities 
expressed in foreign currency. (Grauwe 2013, p. 229–230.) 
However, closely integrated equity markets expressed in the common currency make 
also the transmittance of country-specific risks and asymmetric shocks more rapid 
(Grauwe, 2013, p. 10). Even though the currency risk is eliminated in the monetary 
union, the existence and the transmittance of country risks hinders the further 
integration of the equity markets in the Eurozone. Also, the regulatory differences 
between countries in corporate taxation and accounting principles makes it harder to 
compare the values of different equities across the Eurozone. (Grauwe, 2013, p. 230.) 
The sovereign debt crisis, the liquidity crisis in 2008 have had a considerable effect 
also on the equity markets. During the 2008 liquidity crisis starting from the United 
States, the shock to the US equity markets spread rapidly also to the equity markets 
in the Eurozone and was one effect to the birth of the sovereign debt crisis. (Mollah 
et al, 2016.) 
Aizenman et al. (2016) observed that especially the sovereign debt crisis imposed 
decreasing returns for the equity markets in the Eurozone during the shock. This was 
mainly due to the interdependence of the financial markets in the Eurozone and the 
negative spillovers in the financial markets. It was also observed that good news 
affect positively to the equity market return and bad news negatively to the returns. 
In this research a stock index and the implied volatility of a stock index are used as 
dependent variables. The decreases in the stock market returns and the increase in the 
implied volatility have been proven to exist during a financial crisis (Nyberg, 2012). 
3.1 EURO STOXX 50 
Euro STOXX 50 is a stock index that describes the returns of the 50 largest and most 
liquid stocks of the biggest companies in Eurozone, and it contains the data from 
companies from over 11 European countries. It is quoted by STOXX, an index 
provider of the Deutsche Borse and the index serves many international financial 
institutions as a benchmark of many investment products, such as exchange-traded 
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funds and options that are sold to the investors. The index was first introduced on the 
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th
 of February 1998. (STOXX, 2018.) 
The returns of price, net return and gross return are calculated every 15 seconds from 
its opening in 09:00 CET to its closing in 18:00 CET expressed both in euros and US 
dollars. The index is available in several other currencies as well, but the returns in 
other currencies are available only on the end-of-day of the index at 18:00 CET. The 
calculation of the daily indices is calculated with the Laspeyres formula illustrated 
below. The formula measures price changes against a fixed base quantity weight for 
the time 𝑡 for 𝑛 number of companies. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 =  
∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑡 × 𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 × 𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡 × 𝑥𝑖𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐷𝑡
=  
𝑀𝑡
𝐷𝑡
 
 
        
                   (2)  
Here 𝑝𝑖𝑡 represents the price of the stock 𝑖 in time 𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖𝑡 the number of stocks of 
the company 𝑖 in time 𝑡. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the so called free-float factor of the company 𝑖 in 
time 𝑡, 𝑐𝑓𝑖𝑡 is the weighting cap of the company 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents the 
exchange rate from local currency into index currency for company 𝑖 at time 𝑡. By 
multiplication the 𝑀𝑡, the free-float market capitalization of the index at time 𝑡 is 
acquired to the numerator. 𝐷𝑡 in the denominator represents the divisor of the index 
at time 𝑡. (STOXX, 2018.) 
Due to its liquidity and the usage as a common benchmark, the Euro STOXX 50 is 
used as a benchmark in this research to describe the development of the equity 
markets during 2005-2014 in the Eurozone. The development of the Euro STOXX 50 
is illustrated in the figure below. The effects of the sovereign debt crisis and the 
liquidity crisis on the index can be clearly distinguished. The Euro STOXX 50 stock 
index decreased by over 2500 points during the 2008 liquidity crisis. During the start 
of the sovereign debt crisis, the index faced another considerable drop and negative 
returns during the end of 2011. 
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Figure 6. The development of the opening values of the Euro STOXX 50-index during 2005-2014. 
3.2 IMPLIED VOLATILITY 
Another measurement of stock market activity in addition to the stock indices is the 
volatility in the given stock market. Volatility is used as a measure of uncertainty in 
the financial markets by measuring the frequency and magnitude of different kinds of 
price movements in a given market. It can be calculated either by calculating the 
historical volatility or the implied volatility. When calculating the historical 
volatility, actual realized historical price changes are used, whereas the implied 
volatility uses the option prices of the stock market. One of the most known indices 
of implied volatility is the VIX-index designed by the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange in 1993 to measure the implied volatility of the S&P 500-index. (Chicago 
Board Options Exchange, 2018.) 
The Euro STOXX 50 Volatility-index is constructed to measure the intraday 
volatility in the Euro STOXX 50 stock index. It is based on the Euro STOXX 50 
options prices and is designed to reflect the market expectations of near-term up to 
long-term volatility. The Euro STOXX 50 Volatility-index measures not only the 
implied volatility, but the implied variance of the options of a given time to maturity. 
(STOXX, 2018).  
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The Euro STOXX 50 Volatility-indices are calculated for 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 
210, 240, 270, 300, 330 and 360 days to expire from which the focus is on the 30-day 
Euro STOXX 50 volatility. In addition to the main indices, 8 sub-indices are also 
calculated based on the Euro STOXX 50 option expiries ranging from one month to 
one year. The main indices are calculated with linear interpolation of specific sub-
indices, which make the main indices independent of a specific time to expiration. 
(STOXX, 2018.) 
The index is calculated by taking the square root of the implied variances of all the 
options of a given time to maturity. The main indices are calculated as a time-
weighted average (interpolation) of two sub-indices which include the same time to 
expire as the main index. The formula for calculation for determining the main index 
𝑀𝐼𝑡𝑚 with fixed time to maturity of tm days is illustrated below. 
𝑀𝐼𝑡𝑚 =  100 × √[
𝑇𝑠𝑡
𝑇365
× (
𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑡
199
)2 ×
𝑇𝑙𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡𝑚
𝑇𝑙𝑡 − 𝑇𝑠𝑡
+
𝑇𝑙𝑡
𝑇365
× (
𝑆𝐼𝑙𝑡
100
)2 ×
𝑇𝑡𝑚 − 𝑇𝑠𝑡
𝑇𝑙𝑡 − 𝑇𝑠𝑡
] ×
𝑇365
𝑇𝑚
 
(3) 
Here 𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑡 represents the sub-index with shorter maturity and 𝑆𝐼𝑙𝑡 the sub-index with 
longer maturity used in the interpolation. 𝑇𝑠𝑡 indicates the time to expiry of 𝑆𝐼𝑠𝑡 in 
seconds and 𝑇𝑙𝑡 the time to expiry of 𝑆𝐼𝑙𝑡 in seconds. 𝑇𝑡𝑚 is the amount of seconds in 
one day (86,400 seconds) and 𝑇365 the amount seconds in one year (31 536 000 
seconds). (STOXX, 2018.) 
The determination of the sub-indices with shorter and longer maturities is expressed 
as the square root of the implied variance 𝜎𝑖
2 for the ith Euro STOXX 50 option 
expiry date and the sub-index: 
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√𝜎𝑖
2 =  √
2
𝑇𝑖
𝑇365
⁄
× ∑
∆𝐾𝑖𝑗
𝐾𝑖𝑗
2
𝑗
× 𝑅𝑖 × 𝑀𝐾𝑖𝑗 −
1
𝑇𝑖
𝑇365
⁄
× (
𝐹𝑖
𝐾𝑖,0
− 1)2  
 
        
                   (4)  
Here 𝑇𝑖 measures the time to the i
th
 option expiry date in seconds, 𝑅𝑖 is the 
refinancing factor with the interpolated risk-free rate and 𝑀𝐾𝑖𝑗is the inclusion price 
of the option with strike price 𝐾𝑖𝑗 for the j
th
 option. 𝐾𝑖,0 represents the maximum 
strike price that doesn’t exceed the value of 𝐹𝑖, which is the price of the forward 
contract for the i
th
 option expiry date. ∆𝐾𝑖𝑗 measures the average difference between 
the strike prices of the options slightly above and below 𝐾𝑖𝑗. (STOXX, 2018.) 
The development of the Euro STOXX 50 Volatility-index is illustrated in the figure 
below. From the graph it is easy to identify how the implied volatility quadrupled 
during the 2008 liquidity crisis. Two other significant peaks have occurred during the 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and in the end of 2011. 
 
Figure 7. The development of the opening values of the Euro STOXX 50 Volatility index during 2005-2014. 
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4 EVIDENCE FROM EARLIER RESEARCH 
4.1 MONEY MARKETS 
As already stated, the liquidity crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have been 
observed to reduce the integration of banks in the interbank market. The potential 
effects in the money markets during a financial crisis are evaluated further, since the 
interbank market can correlate with a financial crisis in many ways. 
Perera and Wickramanayake (2016) observed that macroeconomic factors in 
government policies and banking were major determinants of changes and 
adjustments in commercial bank interest rates. The transparency and the financial 
stability of the central bank policies were also key factors identified in a research 
conducted with a panel data from 122 different countries inside and outside the 
Eurozone.  
The interbank market itself is a major determinant in the economy and it itself cause 
fluctuations in the business cycle. Giri (2018) examined an explicit interbank market, 
where banks invest their excess liquidity either into the interbank market or to 
government bonds. The study indicated that an increase in the default risk in the 
interbank market can freeze the money market. This freeze would create a flow of 
funds from the relatively riskier interbank assets to safer assets like government 
bonds. The credit supply in the money market would decrease, which would lead 
eventually into a recession caused by the reduction in investment and household 
consumption.  
Iyer et al. (2014) faced similar empirical observations of a credit crunch during the 
2007 liquidity crisis. The interbank market faced a liquidity shock, which made 
firms’ access to credit more difficult in the frozen financial markets. Especially small 
entrepreneurial firms couldn’t obtain finance from other banks in the market to 
compensate their situation. The firms’ decreased access to credit lead to decreased 
investment activity. 
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Cassola and Moriana (2012) on the other hand conducted a research on the 
correlation of the financial crisis and the money market turbulence in the Eurozone. 
Increased spreads between Euribor and OIS during the 2007 liquidity crisis were 
observed, reflecting increased counterparty risks, credit risks and liquidity risks in 
the interbank market. Two breaking points in the spread were observed in the same 
instant of time across all maturities. The first point was the day when the French 
bank BNP Paribas announced that it would be impossible to determine the value of 
its structured products for two of its funds that have been exposed to the subprime 
mortgages. The spread reached its maximum in 16
th
 of September 2008, when 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 
The effect of the change in monetary policy was also imminent. When the European 
Central Bank reduced its interest rate by 75 basis points on December 2008, the 
rising trend of Euribor-OIS spreads was broken and the spreads begun to decrease. 
This caused a radical reduction in the credit risk and liquidity risk in the interbank 
market. 
Taboga (2014) also observed the increase in the levels and volatility of the Euribor-
OIS spreads during the financial crisis in 2007. One explanation on this was found 
from the empirical evidence of the panel survey when the Euribor is calculated. 
Before the crisis many European banks had high credit ratings and were considered 
as “prime” banks, which made almost all of the participating pane banks to seem 
creditworthy. However, after the financial crisis increased uncertainty in the 
interbank market and banks experienced sharp decreases in their credit ratings, the 
definition of a credit-worthy prime bank became more subjective. 
4.2 THE STOCK MARKET AND VOLATILITY 
The 2007 liquidity crisis that originated from the United States, spread quickly all 
over the world and caused significant decreases in the stock markets around the 
globe. The crisis had a significant contribution to the equity markets in the Eurozone 
as studied by Mollah et al. (2016). The United States was the major determinant to 
the drop in the equity markets in the Eurozone at that time, and it was observed that 
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the equity markets in the United States affected the European equity markets also in 
several cases during the time period of 2003 to 2013.  
Nyberg (2012) researched the risk-return tradeoff in excess stock market returns with 
a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedacity-in-mean model in the stock 
markets of the United States over business cycles. Nyberg concluded that stock 
returns vary over business cycles, implying that during recessions the stock market 
returns are mainly more negative than times when no recession is present in the 
economy. Recessions have followed financial crises globally and negative stock 
returns have correlated with financial crises. However, it was still observed that a 
positive risk-return relationship exists between volatility and expected return with no 
dependency on the business cycle. 
Hamilton and Lin (1996) performed a joint time-series analysis on the stock market 
volatility and the growth in industrial production. Research indicated that economic 
recessions have been the main determinant for the fluctuations in the stock market 
volatility. This introduces the correlation between the stock market volatility, 
economic recessions and thus financial crises. 
Caporale et al. (2016) studied the linkages between the S&P500 and the Euro 
STOXX 50 stock indices. The results suggested a correlation between the two from 
1996 to 2009. After 2009 however, the correlation was observed not to be as 
significant and the two indices followed quite different recovery paths. It could thus 
be argued that the endogenous contagion of the financial crisis from the United 
States to the Europe was mainly due to the high integration of the financial markets 
between the two.  
The development of the situation in the United States was observed to introduce 
regime changes also in the EONIA swap rate in the Eurozone. Similarly, the daily 
euro fixed-float OIS has been estimated to be dependent on the implied volatility of 
the S&P 500-index due to its nature of reflecting market expectations. (Eross et al, 
2018.) 
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Market volatility has been observed to affect the stock returns both directly and 
indirectly and the negative relationship between the two arises mainly from greater 
risks and increased liquidity premiums (Chung & Chuwonganant, 2018). This 
implies that liquidity is a major determinant in stock market volatility and in stock 
market returns, and a decrease in the market liquidity should increase the implied 
volatility and decrease the stock market returns. These observations support the data 
presented in figures 3 and 4, where the 2007 liquidity crisis caused decreased returns 
in the Euro STOXX 50 index and increased volatility of the index. 
Schreiber et al. (2012) observed that the negative relationship between asset prices in 
the equity markets and the credit spreads hold during the pre-crisis period but didn’t 
hold during the liquidity crisis in 2007. The stock market returns were not observed 
to be significant predictors of credit spreads during the crisis. However, the credit 
spreads and the decrease in liquidity were indeed observed to affect the stock market 
volatility. 
4.3 EVIDENCE FROM LIBOR-OIS 
Earlier research has been conducted on the significance of the spread outside the 
Eurozone between the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the Overnight 
Indexed Swap (OIS) and their indications of a financial crisis. It has been a closely 
watched indicator and most of the research conducted have utilized the 3-month 
maturity of the interbank offered rate as their data. 
Before the liquidity crisis caused disturbance to the interbank market in 2007, the 
LIBOR-OIS spread was observed to lie around 10 basis points. The spread rose 
quickly near to 100 basis points during three events. The first increase occurred when 
the Bank of England announced to introduce emergency funding on the 14
th
 of 
September 2007 to bail out Northern Rock, which was one of the biggest mortgage 
lenders in the United Kingdom. Similarly, during the increased losses of big 
investment banks like UBS and Lehman Brothers on the 10
th
 of December 2007 and 
during the collapse of Bear Sterns on 17
th
 of March 2008, the spread rose to higher 
levels before reaching its peak of 365 basis points on the announcement of the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 10
th
 of October 2008. (Sengupta & Man Tam, 
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2008.) Thus, the LIBOR-OIS spread can be considered as an indicator of 
disturbances in the money markets during the time period examined in this thesis. 
The main determinants of the LIBOR-OIS spread have been researched in several 
studies. In line with the results of Eross et al. (2018), Pellizzon and Sartore (2013) 
also identified the implied volatility of the S&P 500-index as one of the key 
explanations of the spread. The most significant variable however was the volume of 
credit default swaps for both Euribor and Libor markets. The index for credit default 
swaps had an inverse relationship to the spread, which indicates that tensions in the 
interbank market liquidity causes the increases in the LIBOR-OIS spreads. 
Cui et al. (2016) examined the determinants of five major currency LIBOR-OIS 
spread changes during the period of interbank market distress. In line with the results 
of earlier studies, it was observed that in addition to the credit risks and counterparty 
risks, the market liquidity and volatility were the determinants of the spread in the 
interbank markets. Furthermore, the financial leverage of the commercial banks and 
the state of the economy affected the spread. These results are in line with the 
expectations that the spread should correlate highly with certain events during the 
liquidity crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. 
The liquidity shocks affect both the money markets and the equity markets, and they 
influence the market expectations. Based on earlier empirical research, the 
hypothesis is that increases should occur also in the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread 
during the times of a financial crisis and that these spreads should correlate with 
macroeconomic events, stock market returns and the changes in the implied volatility 
of the stock markets in some extent.  
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5 METHOD 
The data is gathered for the Euribor and the EONIA Swap from 20
th
 of June 2005 to 
30
th
 of June 2014 for all the maturities. The population of the data consists of total 
2 290 data points which represent the trading days when both the money market and 
the capital market instruments have been traded during the time period. Weekends 
and other bank holidays are thus excluded from the data. In this research the 3-month 
Euribor and the 3-month EONIA Swap are chosen to determine the spread between 
the two rates for each day for the same maturity. The main motivation for using the 
3-month maturity is the existing empirical research on the effects of a financial crisis 
to the interbank market. 
The spread is first calculated by subtracting the 3-month EONIA Swap from the 3-
month Euribor in each period T and expressed in basis points: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡  = 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑆𝑊𝐴𝑃𝑡   
 
        
                   (5)  
After which the daily logarithmic differences of the spread are used, which are 
implied with 𝑋𝑡 and calculated as: 
𝑋𝑡  = 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡) − ln (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1)  
 
        
                   (6)  
Logarithmic returns and differences are used to remove any trends in the data. The 
study includes also the daily logarithmic returns for the Euro STOXX 50 stock index 
and the daily logarithmic differences in the Euro STOXX 50 Volatility index from 
the same time period. The daily returns for both indices are calculated by the 
differences of the opening values of consecutive trading days. The goal is to evaluate 
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how the change in 𝑋𝑡 affects to the returns of the stock market and stock market 
volatility over time. 
The spread is evaluated by a standard OLS-regression. The OLS-method is used for 
its position of being currently the dominant method used in practice in the field of 
economics. OLS is also considered as an efficient unbiased estimator. (Stock & 
Watson, 2012, p. 121–123.) 
An autoregressive model with an exogenous predictor is used to represent the 
random process of the returns in the stock market and the changes in the stock 
market volatility. An autoregressive model relates the time series variables to their 
past values. The following autoregressive model of the order 𝑝 in is used in both 
cases: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝛽0  + ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=1
𝑌𝑡−𝑚 + ∑ 𝜑𝑛
𝑝
𝑛=1
𝑋𝑡−𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡 
 
  
(7) 
Here 𝑌𝑡 represents the dependent variable which is the daily return at time t of an 
index of interest 𝛽0  is the first coefficient in the model and 𝛽𝑚 values are the lagged 
parameters of the dependent variables 𝑌𝑡. 𝜑𝑛 values are the lagged parameters of the 
spread 𝑋𝑡. The dependent variable 𝑌𝑡 is represented thus by its lagged parameters and 
the lagged parameters of the independent variable 𝑋𝑡. 𝜀𝑡 represents the white noise, 
the residual of the regression, which is minimized by using the method of least 
squares. The Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used in this 
regression analysis. The goal is to measure on what degree the changes in the spread 
affect the returns of the indices. In this analysis 8 degrees of freedom are used for 𝑚 
and 𝑛. 
In addition, the development of the spread during the crisis is evaluated manually on 
specific dates. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on the 16
th
 of September 2008, 
the date of the news release of BNP Paribas and other specific events and dates in the 
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sovereign debt crisis are examined to determine if the development in the spread 
could’ve been used as an indicator of the shocks. 
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6 RESULTS 
6.1 EURIBOR-EONIA SPREAD AND EURO STOXX 50 INDEX 
 
Figure 8. Returns of the Euro STOXX 50, Euribor-EONIA Swap-spread and the regression residuals. 
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The figure above represents the plot of the daily logarithmic returns of the Euro 
STOXX 50 index, the daily logarithmic differences of the spread and the residuals 
from each observation of the regression. There seems to exist increased variance in 
the residuals during the times of the crisis which implies that the linear 
autoregressive model doesn’t provide a decent fit for the data in times of a crisis. 
Also, worth noting for is the fact that the logarithmic daily differences of the spread 
have decreased in magnitude before the crisis, whereas the magnitude of the daily 
logarithmic returns of the stock index have been in their extremes during the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009. During the times of the financial crisis, the logarithmic 
returns in the stock market have been relatively more negative than during times 
when no crisis has been present in the financial markets. 
The table below illustrates the coefficients from the regression with their standard 
errors and p-values. 
Table 1. Regression results of the Euro STOXX 50 and the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread. 
  coeff std err t stat p-value      95% conf. int. 
Y(t)-1 - 0,0124 0,038 - 0,325 0,745 - 0,087 0,062 
Y(t)-2 - 0,0464 0,043 - 1,068 0,285 - 0,132 0,039 
Y(t)-3 - 0,0419 0,038 - 1,115 0,265 - 0,116 0,032 
Y(t)-4 0,0109 0,036 0,303 0,762 - 0,060 0,082 
Y(t)-5 - 0,0383 0,039 - 0,991 0,322 - 0,114 0,038 
Y(t)-6 0,0035 0,034 0,102 0,919 - 0,063 0,070 
Y(t)-7 0,0180 0,034 0,526 0,599 - 0,049 0,085 
Y(t)-8 - 0,0159 0,032 - 0,493 0,622 - 0,079 0,047 
x(t)-1 - 0,0086 0,004 - 2,200 0,028 - 0,016 - 0,001 
x(t)-2 - 0,0024 0,003 - 0,782 0,434 - 0,008 0,004 
x(t)-3 - 0,0024 0,003 - 0,787 0,431 - 0,008 0,004 
x(t)-4 - 0,0005 0,003 - 0,141 0,888 - 0,007 0,006 
x(t)-5 - 0,0040 0,003 - 1,159 0,247 - 0,011 0,003 
x(t)-6 0,0014 0,003 0,424 0,672 - 0,005 0,008 
x(t)-7 0,0003 0,003 0,093 0,926 - 0,006 0,007 
x(t)-8 - 0,0006 0,002 - 0,260 0,795 - 0,005 0,004 
Durbin-Watson           2,001  
 
 Multiple R         0,099  
F-value 
 
          1,389  
 
 R^2  
 
       0,010  
Significance F           0,137  
 
 Adjusted R Square         0,003  
Observations            2280     Standard Error         0,014  
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The value of 𝑅2 implies how much the independent variable of the model explains 
the observed variation in the model (Stock & Watson, 2012, p. 123). In the model, 
the 0,01 value of 𝑅2 implies that the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread explains only 1% 
of the observed variation of the stock index return. The model has a standard error of 
0,014 and the p-value of the 1,389 F-statistic is 0,137. The relatively high p-value for 
the F-statistic implies that the model would not be statistically significant, but the F-
statistic is not accurate in the case of using heteroskedastic robust standard errors and 
the corresponding p-value should not be heavily relied on this case (Stock & Watson, 
2012, p. 228). 
The coefficients of the regression are in general considered statistically significant, if 
their p-value is less than 0,05 (Stock & Watson, 2012, p. 78). From the results the 
coefficient 𝑋𝑡−1 is identified as statistically significant with a p-value of 0,028. The 
negative sign of the coefficient implies that an increase in the spread causes a 
decrease in the stock market return. According to the results, an 1% increase in the 
spread should imply an 0,86% decrease in the Euro STOXX 50 index. The Durbin-
Watson test indicates that there exists no autocorrelation in the residuals of the data, 
since the value of the test is close to the value of 2. 
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6.2 EURIBOR-EONIA SPREAD AND THE EURO STOXX 50 
VOLATILITY 
 
 
Figure 9. Returns of the Euro STOXX 50 Volatility, Euribor-EONIA Swap-spread and the regression 
residuals. 
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The figure above represents the plot of the daily logarithmic returns of the Euro 
STOXX 50 volatility index, the daily logarithmic differences of the spread and the 
residuals from the regression. In this case it is again noted that there exist in some 
extent increased variance in the residuals during the times of the crisis and the data 
doesn’t offer a decent fit into a linear regression model. In the case of volatility, the 
daily logarithmic returns of the volatility do not seem to follow as clear trend as for 
example the returns of the stock index but still seem to be the highest during times 
when a crisis is introduced to the financial markets. 
The table below illustrates the coefficients from the regression with their standard 
errors and p-values. 
Table 2. Regression results of the Euro STOXX 50 Volatility and the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread 
  coeff std err t stat p-value 95% conf. int. 
Y(t)-1 - 0,1123 0,027 - 4,158 0,000 - 0,165 - 0,059 
Y(t)-2 - 0,0749 0,025 - 2,976 0,003 - 0,124 - 0,026 
Y(t)-3 - 0,0669 0,027 - 2,504 0,012 - 0,119 - 0,015 
Y(t)-4 - 0,0676 0,026 - 2,577 0,010 - 0,119 - 0,016 
Y(t)-5 - 0,0113 0,024 - 0,460 0,646 - 0,059 0,037 
Y(t)-6 - 0,0538 0,024 - 2,222 0,026 - 0,101 - 0,006 
Y(t)-7 - 0,0303 0,025 - 1,194 0,233 - 0,080 0,019 
Y(t)-8 - 0,0536 0,024 - 2,272 0,023 - 0,100 - 0,007 
x(t)-1 0,0571 0,017 3,342 0,001 0,024 0,091 
x(t)-2 0,0190 0,014 1,332 0,183 - 0,009 0,047 
x(t)-3 0,0086 0,017 0,518 0,605 - 0,024 0,041 
x(t)-4 0,0098 0,017 0,574 0,566 - 0,024 0,043 
x(t)-5 0,0039 0,018 0,224 0,823 - 0,030 0,038 
x(t)-6 - 0,0092 0,016 - 0,557 0,578 - 0,041 0,023 
x(t)-7 - 0,0073 0,013 - 0,555 0,579 - 0,033 0,018 
x(t)-8 - 0,0136 0,014 - 0,943 0,346 - 0,042 0,015 
Durbin-Watson Test             2,004  
 
 Multiple R         0,176  
F-value 
 
            4,536  
 
 R^2 
 
       0,031  
Significance F             0,000  
 
 Adjusted R Square         0,024  
Observations             2 280     Standard Error         0,061  
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In this model, the 0,031 value of 𝑅2 implies that the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread 
explains only 3,1% of the observed variation of the return of the stock index 
volatility. The model has a standard error of 0,061 and the F-statistics of 4,536 is 
statistically significant with a p-value of 0,000. The low p-value for the F-statistics 
implies that the model is statistically significant despite the usage of robust standard 
errors.  
From the results it is identified that the coefficient 𝑋𝑡−1 is statistically significant 
with a p-value of 0,001. The positive sign of the coefficient implies that an increase 
in the spread causes an increase in the stock market volatility. According to the 
results, an 1% increase in the spread should imply a 5,71% increase in the Euro 
STOXX 50 implied volatility. 
The Durbin-Watson test with a value of 2,004 indicates no autocorrelation between 
the residuals of the regression. 
6.3 EURIBOR-EONIA SPREAD AND SHOCKS 
The effect of different macroeconomic shocks is to the spread is also evaluated. In 
the Table 3 below, specific events during the financial crisis in and during the 
sovereign debt crisis are listed along with the changes in the spread. 
Table 3. The change in the spread during the stages of the financial crisis. 
Event 
 
 
                    Date Change in spread 
BNP Paribas ceases the funds 
 
9th of August 2007 +6,7 bps 
Lehman Brothers bankrupcty 16th of September 2008 +7,2 bps 
London G20 summit 
 
2nd of April 2009 +1,3 bps 
Greek debt crisis 9th of May 2010 +1,6 bps 
S&P Downgrades US credit rating 5th of August 2011 +15 bps 
The stages of the financial crisis can be distinguished into 5 different stages. On the 
9
th
 of August, BNP Paribas announced to cease the activities in its three hedge funds 
that were associated with the subprime-mortgages in the United States. It was the 
first instant of time where the existence of problems caused by complex derivatives 
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was noted for the first time. (The Guardian, 7
th
 of August 2011.)  During that day, the 
spread increased approximately 7 basis points. 
On the 16
th
 of September 2008, a year later after the announcement of BNP Paribas, 
the US government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt. 
The bankruptcy caused distress and fear in the financial markets when it was evident 
that the government would not necessarily bail out distressed banks anymore. 
Previously the government of the United States had organized a buyout for Bear 
Sterns and the government in United Kingdom for Northern Rock, but now it looked 
like banks weren’t anymore “too big to fail” (The Guardian, 7
th
 of August 2011). The 
global economy experienced a significant downturn when the credit flows to the 
private sector were diminished and business confidence collapsed due to the fear of 
more bankruptcies in the banking sector. The spread increased 7 basis points on this 
very day as well. 
During the aftermaths of the financial crisis, the G20-countries had their summit in 
London on the 2
th
 of April 2009. During the summit the first measures were taken to 
cut the interest rates to the bare minimum and to tackle the crisis with the help of 
fiscal expansion and by providing support to the International Monetary Fund and 
other global institutions to boost the economy. (The Guardian, 7
th
 of August 2011.) 
The spread reacted in a modest way and increased by 1,3 basis points. 
The crisis shifted from the private sector to the public sector when the Greek debt 
crisis was assessed for the first time on the 9
th
 of May 2010. The International 
Monetary Fund and the European Union decided to provide financial help for 
Greece, which suffered from its high budget deficit (The Guardian, 7
th
 of August 
2011). The concern on the public debt and austerity measures reflected on the 
nervousness of the financial markets and the spread increased 1,6 basis points on that 
day. 
The most significant one-day increase in the spread occurred on the 5
th
 of August 
2011, when Standard&Poor’s, an international credit agency, downgraded the credit 
rating of the United States from the top AAA to a lower level of AA+ (The Guardian, 
7
th
 of August 2011). Downgrading the most powerful economy in the world raised 
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concerns on the future development of the global economy and caused the spread to 
increase over 15 basis points on the 5
th
 of August 2011. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
From the results a conclusion can be made that the most significant changes in the 
data have happened during the financial crisis of 2008. The stock index was at its 
highest a year before the start of the financial crisis, whereas the implied volatility 
and the spread were at their highest during the crisis. During the crisis the stock 
index faced its greatest drop and its minimum value. The Euribor and the EONIA 
Swap were also on their all-time highs during the crisis in 2008. 
During the sovereign debt crisis a few years after the next significant changes in the 
data can be observed. These results indicate that financial crisis has had its effect on 
the data and correlation seems to exist with the changes in the data and the shocks in 
the financial markets. 
Even though during the crisis the significant logarithmic daily returns were observed 
in the stock index during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the logarithmic returns of 
the spread during the same period aren’t as significant. In fact, the logarithmic 
returns of the spread decreased during the financial crisis in 2008 but increased 
during initial phases of the sovereign debt crisis in 2011. However, it seems that the 
logarithmic differences have been more positive than negative during the times of the 
financial crisis. This supports a view that during the times of a crisis there exists 
more of an increasing trend in the development of the spread than during other 
specific periods of time, even though the magnitude of these daily differences isn’t as 
significant during the crisis as in the pre-crisis period. 
The spread seems to correlate with the financial crisis in some extent, and the 
correlation is evaluated more thoroughly next. The results from the regression 
indicate how well does the spread seems to correlate with the stock index and the 
implied volatility. In addition to the correlation, the purpose is to find out if it is fair 
to say that the change in the spread is also the causality of the changes in the stock 
indices and the implied volatility. 
44 
In the following section the specific events that took place during the financial crisis 
are examined and the returns of the indices and the change in the spread on those 
specific dates are evaluated. 
7.1 THE EURIBOR-EONIA SPREAD AND THE EURO STOXX 50 
According to the results, an 1% increase in the spread should imply an 0,86% 
decrease in the Euro STOXX 50 index. The results are in line with the previous 
research that suggested a negative relationship between asset prices in the equity 
markets and the credit spreads. Increased credit risks in the European interbank 
market reflect on the equity markets, which caused in some extent a decrease in the 
stock indices in Europe during 2005-2014. 
As Giri (2018) observed, increased risks in the interbank market would lead the 
economy eventually into a recession caused by the reduction in investment activity 
and household consumption. Furthermore, recessions have correlated with financial 
crises and during this time the stock market returns have mainly been negative when 
the earnings of different companies decrease (Nyberg, 2012). The results indicate 
this correlation between credit spreads in the interbank market and the returns of the 
stock markets during financial crises. 
However, the statistical significance of the results and the magnitude of the 
interdependence seems rather thin and the constructed model might suffer from 
omitted variable bias. The returns in the stock market might be more dependent on 
the levels of economic growth and recessions, market liquidity (Chung & 
Chuwonganant, 2018), dividend yields (Cutler, 1991), general investor sentiment, the 
valuations of alternative investments or industry-specific outlooks and expectations. 
Nyberg (2012) provided supporting evidence for the correlation between GDP 
growth rates and the stock market returns. 
During a recession when stock returns have been observed to be negative, the credit 
risks in the interbank market can maybe remain also unchanged if the recession is 
caused by factors outside the banking sector. An economic recession and business 
cycles can be caused by many other determinants: Iyetomi et al. (2011) researched 
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the Japanese industrial production data and deducted that real demand shocks 
accompanied by significant inventory adjustments have been the major causes of 
business cycles. Exogenous shocks to the exports or technology shocks for example 
can cause real aggregate demand shocks and drive the economy into a recession. 
These examples point out that increased credit risks in the interbank market aren’t 
the only determinant of a recession, even though their role on the financial crises has 
been discussed previously. The correlation between financial crisis and recession is 
evident in many researches especially during the 2008 liquidity crisis, but the 
causality hasn’t been clearly determined. It is also thus determined that a recession 
and decreasing stock market returns can exist also without a change in the spread. 
The internal validity is challenged by the usage of the returns between the opening 
values of the indices, which is disturbed by excluding weekends and other bank 
holidays. Also, the data is constructed from the dates when both the equity markets 
and money markets have been open, and any crossing dates have been excluded from 
the model. This introduces challenges especially to the internal validity in the 
independent variable of Euribor-EONIA Swap spread. 
As Schreiber et al. (2012) observed, the negative relationship between the asset 
prices in the equity markets and the credit spreads hold during the pre-crisis period 
but failed to hold during the liquidity crisis in 2017. It was concluded that the stock 
market returns were not observed to be a significant predictors of credit spreads 
during the crisis. By examining the results from the regression, the spread seems to 
explain the stock market returns in some extent during the whole period of 2005-
2014, but further evaluation would be needed to see if there are any exceptions 
during the 2008 liquidity crisis. The results from the regression support the 
hypothesis that a negative relationship between the stock market return and the credit 
spread exists, but it cannot be generalized to hold in all circumstances. 
In general, the spread seems to explain the stock market returns but the stock market 
returns aren’t explaining the development of the spread according to earlier research. 
Thus, simultaneous causality shouldn’t exist between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable in the model. This might be due to the mentioned different 
factors that have been evaluated to be the main determinants of stock market returns 
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and affect the returns more than the development of the Euribor-EONIA Swap 
spread. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to the financial crises in the Eurozone, the negative 
returns in the Euro STOXX 50 stock index and the increases in the Euribor-EONIA 
Swap spread have both been present. As the negative equity market returns are 
correlating with a financial crisis, it can be said that the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread 
was an indicator of decreasing asset returns and thus an indicator of a financial crisis 
in the Eurozone during 2005-2014 despite the possible omitted variable bias. 
However, he spread doesn’t always correlate with the returns since stock market 
returns can also be negative during an economic recession without any change in the 
spread 
7.2 THE SPREAD AFFECTED EURO STOXX 50 VOLATILITY 
According to the results, an 1% increase in the spread should imply a 5,71% increase 
in the Euro STOXX 50 implied volatility. The results are in line with the previous 
research that suggested a positive relationship between stock market volatility in the 
and the credit spreads. Increased credit risks in the European interbank market reflect 
on the equity markets, which caused in some extent an increase in the stock market 
volatility in Europe during 2005-2014. 
Increased risks in the interbank market would lead the economy eventually into a 
recession and during recessions the stock market volatility has been observed to 
increase (Hamilton & Lin, 1996). The results indicate this correlation between credit 
spreads in the interbank market and the stock market volatility. 
Schreiber et al. (2012) observed that the credit spreads affected the stock market 
volatility. Similarly, Pellizzon and Sartore (2013) observed that the implied volatility 
of the S&P 500-index has been correlating with spread between LIBOR and OIS. 
The regression results of this thesis also suggest that increases in the Euribor EONIA 
Swap spread introduced increases to the stock market volatility with statistical 
significance, and thus the results are in line with previous research.  
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However, the model might again suffer from omitted variable bias. Wang and Deng 
(2018) determined that the stock market volatility is caused mainly by investors’ 
expectations and behaviour. The investor-expectations were determined to form 
mainly based on positive signals and negative signals in the information flow. These 
signals can be in theory almost anything, all the way from the actions of influential 
investors to political instabilities. Additional variables to the stock market volatility 
might be needed to include in the model to eliminate the omitted variable bias and to 
increase the statistical significance of the results. 
The credit spread is an indicator of distress in the interbank market and this can 
affect to the investor sentiment when fears arise on the liquidity of the banking 
sector. However, it is challenging to distinguish the effect of the credit spread to the 
market expectations from other factors. For example, decreasing levels of economic 
growth can be more significant factor for stock market volatility than the credit 
spread. The determination of the main factors for the investor sentiment and thus for 
the stock market volatility challenges the significance of the change in the Euribor-
EONIA Swap as a significant explanatory variable for the Euro STOXX 50 
Volatility-index. 
As in the previous case, the internal validity is challenged by the fact that some 
trading days have been omitted from the time series to include the same trading days 
for the money markets and the equity markets in the Eurozone during the time period 
of interest. 
It can be identified that the implied volatility of the Euro STOXX 50 increased 
during financial crises in the Eurozone. According to the results, increases in the 
Euribor EONIA Swap correlate with the increases in the stock market volatility. The 
Euribor-EONIA Swap spread was an indicator of increased stock market volatility 
and thus an indicator of a financial crisis in the Eurozone during 2005-2014 despite 
the possibility of omitted variable bias. Increases in the credit risks in the interbank 
market can certainly affect the market expectations in the financial markets and thus 
affecting the stock market volatility. 
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7.3 THE SPREAD DURING THE STAGES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
By evaluating the data, it can be concluded that during the specific events during the 
financial crisis the spread between the two rates has increased relatively more 
compared to the days when no information or announcements were given in the 
information flow. For instance, before the announcement of BNP Paribas on the 9
th
 
of August 2007 the spread between the two rates had increased by 4 basis points 
during the past week. In that context, an increase of 6,7 basis points in one day can 
be considered as relatively significant increase in the spread. On the 9
th
 of August 
2007, the spread increased to 18 basis points. Before the announcement, the average 
size of the spread from 2005 to 2007 was approximately 5,7 basis points but 
increased in a month to 66 basis points right after the announcement. The 
announcement introduced clearly an increasing trend to the development of the 
spread and indicated distress in the banking sector for the first time. 
Also, the increase of 7,2 basis points on the date of the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers was a significant change in the spread that caused the spread to grow 
rapidly. On the 16
th
 of September 2008, the spread was 73,7 basis points and during 
the aftermaths of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the spread reached its maximum 
value of 186 basis points on the 24
th
 of October in 2008. This supports the view that 
was obtained from the case of BNP Paribas: After the announcement an increasing 
trend in the spread was observed and the spread indicates a banking crisis in this 
case. 
The spread reacted the most to the announcement of downgrading the US credit 
rating with an increase of 15 basis points. Before the downgrading, the spread lied 
around its levels of 20 to 30 basis points. After the announcement however, the 
spread again went to an increasing path and reached a value of 100 basis points a few 
months later. Again, the announcement of negative information in the information 
flow caused the spread to increase and indicated increased fear and distress in the 
interbank market. 
During the ignition of the Greek debt crisis that introduced the sovereign debt crisis 
to the Eurozone, the spread didn’t react significantly to any specific announcements. 
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Also, during the aftermaths of the sovereign debt crisis, there weren’t any significant 
increasing trends in the development of the spread. The spread lied around 30 basis 
points the whole year. It is an interesting fact considering that many European banks 
possessed great amounts of Greek government debt. 
The spread didn’t seem to react significantly to the new data presented from the 
London G20 Summit. After the London G20 summit the spread decreased from its 
value of 72 basis points to 61 basis points within a month. This might be due to the 
relieving messages that were presented in the summit. Commitment from the G20 
countries to increase employment and growth after the cut of interest rates indicated 
that the global economy indeed was in a turn, increasing confidence in the financial 
markets. 
By observing the data, it can be identified that specific shocks affected the 
development of the spread. Distress in the interbank market reflected on the 
development of the spread when negative information was introduced. Similarly, 
positive news from the London G20 Summit caused the spread to decrease. There 
seems to be a correlation between the development of the spread and specific events 
during the financial crisis. When no information was presented, any significant 
changes or trends in the development of the spread were not observed. 
The theory of an interest states that more the lender takes a risk, the higher is the 
interest rate required by the lender from the borrower. Since the Euribor-rate 
represents an interest rate that has in some degree more risk than the EONIA, 
increased credit risk reflects on the increase in the spread between the Euribor and 
the EONIA Swap. Specific events during the financial crisis increased uncertainty in 
the interbank market due to the fears of the liquidity and solvency of the banking 
system. Especially the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers increased risks in the 
interbank markets and spread fear globally to the financial markets. 
However, it seems that the role of the spread seems to be more reactive than 
predictive. No major increases in the spread were observed on the times before the 
occurrence of the events. Spread reacted on the new information and was an 
indicator but was unable to be a valid predictor of different banking crises such as the 
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collapse of the Lehman Brothers. By looking at the development of the spread, one 
can see correlation with the specific events during the financial crisis and see that the 
development of the spread indicates distress in the financial markets but cannot make 
predictions on the development of the situation. 
Also, as observed from the figures 8 and 9, the magnitude for the changes in the 
spread has varied. Even though the shocks have introduced an increasing trend to the 
spread during certain times and events, the magnitude of the daily changes hasn’t 
been as significant as it was during 2006-2007, for instance. 
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8 SUMMARY 
The spread between the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Overnight Indexed 
Swap has been researched in previous research to be an indicator of distress in the 
financial markets. During financial crisis, the spread between LIBOR and OIS has 
been observed to increase. The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the similar spread in 
the Eurozone, by researching the spread between the 3-month Euribor and the 3-
month EONIA Swap. 
The spread measures the credit and default risks in the interbank market, since it 
represents the difference between an Interbank Offered Rate that has a credit risk in 
some degree and the EONIA Swap, which is risk-free since no exchange in principal 
is required in the swap agreement. The theory of an interest rate states that more the 
lender takes a risk, the higher is the interest rate required by the lender from the 
borrower. Since the Euribor-rate represents an interest rate that has in some degree 
more risk than the EONIA, increased credit risk reflects to the increase in the spread 
between Euribor and the EONIA Swap.  
According to the results, the spread between Euribor and the EONIA Swap explains 
in some extent the returns in the stock market and the implied volatility of the stock 
market in the Eurozone. Increases in the spread correlate with negative returns in the 
stock market and increases in the stock market volatility. The decreasing returns in 
the stock market and increased stock market volatility have both been evaluated to 
exist during a financial crisis, but negative stock returns can also occur during an 
economic recession independent on the credit risk development in the interbank 
market. The spread explains the stock market volatility better than the stock market 
returns on the used data. 
It is concluded that the spread between Euribor and the EONIA Swap indicates not 
only distress in the interbank market but also a financial crisis through correlating 
with the negative stock market returns and the increased implied volatility of the 
stock market. By observing the development in the spread it is possible to identify 
the times of a financial crisis, since the spread has been increasing during times of 
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financial crisis. The Euribor-EONIA Swap works as an indicator, but its validity is 
challenged by other variables that have been possible been omitted. 
The spread also correlates with specific events during the liquidity crisis in 2008 and 
the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. With new negative information was 
presented, the spread illustrated an increasing trend by reflecting increased 
uncertainty in the financial markets. Similarly, positive news caused the spread to 
decrease. When no information was presented, any significant changes or trends in 
the development of the spread were observed. 
However, the spread doesn’t seem to have a predictive force, since the spread is 
more reactive than predictive for the specific events during financial crisis. No major 
increases in the spread were observed on the times before the occurrence of the 
events. Spread reacted on the new information presented and was an indicator but 
was unable to be a valid predictor of different banking crises such as the collapse of 
the Lehman Brothers. The spread can be used as an indicator but not as a predictor of 
financial crisis according to the results of this research. Also it cannot be concluded 
that the Euribor-EONIA Swap spread would be a causation of a financial crisis, since 
many alternative determinants exist for the stock market returns, stock market 
volatility and for a financial crisis. 
Further research would require more through determination of different financial 
crisis with their causations and effects. Also, control variables should be introduced 
to make the results internally more valid and statistically more significant to 
eliminate possible omitted variable bias. One might also argue on the order of the 
autoregressive model to determine the extent on how the spread affects the stock 
market returns and the implied volatility of the stock market, and to evaluate the 
statistical significance. Instead of creating the maximum number of lags, further 
research could contain the determination of the order of the autoregression through 
minimizing the Bayes information criterion (BIC), for instance (Stock & Watson, 
2012, p. 551). Also, the residuals might be researched more with the help of a certain 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. 
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In July 2014, the European Money Market Institute announced the discontinuation of 
the EONIA Swap due to the lack of contributing panel banks. Thus, the spread 
between Euribor and the EONIA Swap cannot be used in the future as an indicator of 
financial crisis. The usage of the spread would require a reintroduction of the EONIA 
Swap or an introduction of a similar instrument to the European money markets. 
However, these kinds of introductions aren’t seen probable any near future. 
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